Journal of Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences: Home

Abstract:
Earlier studies by Arrow have shown that uncertainty in elections causes conflict and increases cost. Accurate measurement which leads to easy acceptance of elections saves labor-time required to go over double counting. The purpose of this investigation is to unearth that good leadership and appropriate behavior, which is devoid of the observed conflicts in leadership, could cause and maintain efficiency in the stock market. The method utilized was the deductive approach. This approach provided the study with two distinctive theorems which were deduced from a renowned postulate that led the vital investigation of the study. The postulate that accurate measurement of political elections could eliminate social and political conflicts which characterize modern emerging states that want to do away with poverty and corruption. The results of the investigation reveal that the two theorems gained through the deductive approach permit efficiency to prevail in the stock market thereby fulfilling the first law of Welfare Economics. For they provide stability and equilibrium to the stock market and also caution market competitors about the effect social and transactional costs could have on their businesses. The first and second Welfare laws have been the fundamental building blocks worked upon and championed by Welfare and Behavioral Economists as contributing to market efficiency and market equilibrium. The study concludes, by asserting that we must be aware of social and transactional costs which conflict in the political arena cause to negatively influence the market. These transactional costs impede the occurrence of efficiency in the market and totally disorganize and cause disequilibrium to the market. Because these theorems caution us against the occurrence of social costs and transactional costs, they make the market much more efficient

Keywords: policy, theory, welfare economics, political behavior, efficiency

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